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A reckless approach to negligence
This paper considers the issue of the appropriate standard of care for sport and
recreational situations in the light of the recent decision of the Court of Appeal in Blake v
Galloway[1] which appears to advocate a return to the standard of reckless disregard first
advocated in Wooldridge v Sumner,[2] but then clearly retreated from in subsequent
caselaw such as Condon v Basi,[3] Elliott v Saunders,[4] McCord v Swansea Football
Club and Another,[5] Watson and Another v Gray and Another,[6] and Smolden v
Whitworth and Nolan.[7]
The standard of reckless disregard for issues of negligence in sports and recreational
settings which was first advocated in Wooldridge was not wholly embraced when first
applied. The approach received trenchant criticism almost as soon as the judgment of
the Court of Appeal was handed down. Goodhart, in a withering attack on the finding of
the court stated[8]:
It is on this point regarding the reckless disregard of the safety of others
that the present case seems to introduce a novel element into the law, for it
is unusual to find liability limited to recklessness. In most cases an error of
judgment or a lapse of skill are sufficient to support a charge of negligence.
Although this academic criticism was not followed immediately by similar judicial
intervention, the decision of the Court of Appeal in Wooldridge[9] clearly did not receive
wholehearted support and it was not long before the retreat from the standard advocated
previously in Wooldridge began. The genesis of this retreat can be found in Wilks v
Cheltenham Homeguard.[10]  Phillimore L.J. in discussing the reckless
disregard standard, apparently advocated by both Sellers L.J. and Diplock L.J. in
Wooldridge v Sumner,[11]stated[12]:
It is, however, important to remember that the test remains simply that of
‘negligence and that whether or not the competitor was negligent must be
viewed against all the circumstances – the tests mentioned in Wooldridge v
Sumner are only applied if the circumstances warrant them.
This being the case, it becomes difficult to justify the explicit promotion of the standard
applied in Wooldridge v Sumner[13], and it seemed that Denning M.R. also was less than
enthusiastic about the standard which had been put forward previously. Although not
going as far as Phillimore L.J., he did nevertheless attempt to distance himself from that
decision, by distinguishing the particular facts of the case. Although apparently
suggesting that the approach adopted in Wooldridge was appropriate for the particular
circumstances of that case, the kind of language used by Denning M.R. in reaching his
conclusions was nevertheless far short of an acceptance of the standard of reckless
disregard which had been put forward in Wooldridge. He stated[14]:
In a race the rider is, I think, liable if his conduct is such as to evince a
reckless disregard of the spectators’ safety: in other words, if his conduct
is foolhardy. (Emphasis added)
Foolhardy certainly seems to imply a different standard to that of reckless disregard.
Following this partial retreat, the position in relation to the appropriate standard of care as
applied to sports and recreation settings was clarified by the Court of Appeal in Condon v
Basi.[15]  This case has become the most influential precedent in the area of negligence
in sports and so it is appropriate to examine the case in some detail. Although Donaldson
M.R. was responsible for formulating the appropriate standard of care that has been
applied in subsequent cases, he does not actually offer help in any attempt to distinguish
between the practicalities of reckless disregard and ordinary negligence. The Court
seemed to pay little attention to the difference between these approaches. Whilst
explaining the nature of the behaviour that resulted in the injury, Donaldson M.R. quoted
directly from the experienced match referee’s report. He thus related[16]:
After 62 minutes of play of the above game, a player from Whittle
Wanderers received possession of the ball some 15 yards inside Khalsa
Football Club’s half of the field of play. This Whittle Wanderers’ player upon
realising that he was about to be challenged for the ball by an opponent
pushed the ball (a)way. As he did so, the opponent [the defendant]
challenged, by sliding in from a distance of about three to four yards. The
slide tackle came late, and was made in a reckless and dangerous manner,
by lunging with his boot studs showing about a foot-18 inches from the
ground. The result of this tackle was that [the plaintiff] sustained a broken
right leg. In my opinion, the tackle constituted serious foul play and I sent
[the defendant] from the field of play.
Subsequently, in the County Court, the judge wholly accepted this report, “subject to a
modification in that he thought the defendant’s foot was probably 9 inches off the
ground”[17]. The trial judge continued[18]:
[The tackle] was made in a reckless and dangerous manner not with
malicious intent towards the plaintiff but in an ‘excitable manner without
thought of the consequences’. (Emphasis added)
These judgments were completely accepted by Donaldson M.R., in the Court of Appeal.
In drawing his conclusions, the County Court judge ruled[19]:
It is not for this court to attempt to define exhaustively the duty of care
between players in a soccer football game. Nor, in my judgment, is there
any need because there was here such an obvious breach of the
defendant’s duty of care towards the plaintiff. He was clearly guilty, as I find
the facts, of serious and dangerous foul play which showed a reckless
disregard of the plaintiff’s safety and which fell far below the standards
which might reasonably be expected in anyone pursuing the game.
(Emphasis added)
Donaldson M.R., concluded by stating[20]:
For my part I cannot see how that conclusion can be faulted on its facts,
and on the law I do not see how it can possibly be said that the defendant
was not negligent.
It appears that Wootton J., in the County Court, was applying a standard of reckless
disregard, (at this stage, Wooldridge v Sumner,[21] with it’s imposition of the standard of
reckless disregard appeared to be good authority for sports participant cases, albeit in
that particular instance the case involved injury inflicted by a participant on a spectator
and despite the seeming retreat signalled by Wilks), and through the application of that
standard found the defendant liable in negligence.
There was a dearth of relevant precedent available to guide the Court in its decision, a
fact that clearly surprised Donaldson M.R., who commented[22]
It is said that there is no authority as to what is the standard of care which
governs the conduct of players in competitive sports generally and, above
all, in a competitive sport whose rules and general background contemplate
that there will be physical contact between the players, but that appears to
be the position.
With no precedent to work from, the Court elected to accept a decision from the
Australian High Court, which arose from an injury received whilst water-skiing.
Donaldson M.R., wrote[23] that, “I would completely accept the decision of the High
Court of Australia, in Rootes v Shelton”[24]. Why the Court would choose to accept a
decision arising from a non-contact sport such as water-skiing, (particularly in the face of
more convincing arguments from other jurisdictions), and apply it to an injury received in
association football is a matter of some conjecture, it is though beyond the scope of this
paper. The standard of care to be applied Donaldson M.R., described thus[25]:
There is a general standard of care, namely the Lord Atkin approach in
Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 that you are under a duty to take all
reasonable care taking account of the circumstances in which you are
placed, which in a game of football, are quite different from those which
affect you when you are going for a walk in the countryside.
The approach identified in Rootes v Shelton,[26] and then adopted in Condon v
Basi[27]subsequently guided the application of negligence in sporting and recreational
settings in England and Wales for the next fifteen years. The approach typified by the
words of Curtis J. in Smolden v Whitworth and Others,[28] who stated, “The law is as
stated in Condon v Basi”, therefore accepting the ordinary negligence standard and
rejecting the reckless disregard standard advocated in Wooldridge.
Despite the apparent harmony between principles of ordinary negligence as applied
generally and the principles being applied to the appropriate standard in sports and
recreation settings, there was not universal approval of the approach adopted as was
demonstrated in Caldwell v Maguire & Fitzgerald,[29] a case where a professional jockey
suffered serious injury in a fall and brought an unsuccessful action against the two other
jockeys involved in the incident. At first instance, Holland J. appeared to advocate an
approach more akin to that seen in Wooldridge v Sumner[30] than that adopted in
Condon v Basi. [31] He listed five considerations, the final two of which stated:[32]
4) Given the nature of such prevailing circumstances the threshold for
liability is in practice inevitably high: the proof of a breach of duty will not
flow from proof of no more than an error of judgment or from mere proof of
a momentary lapse in skill (and thus care) respectively when subject to the
stresses of a race. Such are no more than incidents inherent in the nature
of the sport.
5) In practice it may therefore be difficult to prove any such breach of duty
absent of proof of conduct that in point of fact amounts to reckless
disregard for the fellow contestant’s safety. I emphasis (sic) the
distinction between the expression of legal principle and the
practicalities of the evidential burden (Emphasis added)
The reasoning of the court in Caldwell,[33] echoes very much the words of Phillimore
L.J. in Wilks v Cheltenham Homeguard,[34] seen earlier, and the position advocated by
Holland J. was confirmed in the Court of Appeal by Tuckey L.J., who stated:
In his fourth and fifth propositions, the judge made it clear that he was
referring to the practicalities of the evidential burden and not to legal
principle. All he was saying was that, in practice, given the circumstances
which he had identified, the threshold for liability was high. Lord Bingham
CJ said the same of a referee in Smolden, even though, as he pointed out,
the referee was not in the same position as a player because one of the
referee’s responsibilities was the safety of the players. Lord Brennan
accepted that the threshold of liability as between participants must be at
least as high as that between player and referee. The judge did not say
that a claimant has to establish recklessness. That approach was
specifically rejected by this court in Smolden. As in Smolden, there will be
no liability for errors of judgment, oversights or lapses of which any
participant might be guilty in the context of a fast moving contest.
Something more serious is required. I do not think it is helpful to say any
more than this in setting the standard of care to be expected in cases of
this kind.
There is a clear similarity between the position of the law in this area following Wilks and
the position which can be seen following this decision in Caldwell some thirty years later.
Following the decision in Wilks the next time the Court of Appeal had to rule on such an
issue, they chose to adopt the approach that the appropriate standard of care was that of
ordinary negligence taking account of all the circumstances[35]. However, in the light of
the decision in Caldwell which seemed to return to the uncertainty apparent in Wilks, the
Court of Appeal this time seems to have adopted a different approach and it is to an
analysis of this latest decision that this paper now turns.
The case Blake v Galloway,[36] involved a group of five friends, all 15 years old engaged
in horseplay. This horseplay took the form of throwing small pieces of bark and twigs at
one another. The claimant was injured when the defendant struck him in the eye with a
small piece of bark chipping casing serious injury. At first instance, [37]:
DJ Walker, sitting at Plymouth County Court, held that the injury was
caused by the negligence and battery of the defendant, rejected the
defence of volenti non fit injuria, but reduced the damages by 50% to reflect
the claimant’s contributory negligence.
Whilst there are clear differences between horseplay and regulated sports or recreational
activities, the Court of Appeal viewed these differences as inconsequential where the
question of the appropriate standard of care was concerned. Dyson L.J. explained[38]:
In the present case, the horseplay in which the five youths were engaged
was not a regulated sport or game played according to explicit rules, nor
was it organised in a formal sense. Rather, it was in the nature of informal
play, which was being conducted in accordance with certain tacitly agreed
understandings or conventions. …No authority has been cited to us dealing
with negligence in relation to injury caused in the course of horseplay, as
opposed to a formal sport of game. I consider that there is a sufficiently
close analogy between organised and regulated sport or games and the
horseplay in which these youths were engaged for the guidance given by
the authorities to which I have referred[39] to be of value in the resolution of
this case. The only real difference is that there were no formal rules for the
horseplay.
Dyson L.J. then continued[40]:
The common features between horseplay of this kind and formal sport
involving vigorous physical activity are that both involved consensual
participation in an activity (i) which involves physical contact or at least the
risk of it, (ii) in which decisions are usually expected to be made quickly and
often as an instinctive response to the acts of other participants, so that (iii)
the very nature of the activity makes it difficult to avoid the risk of physical
harm.
The Court of Appeal in Caldwell[41] clearly stated that although the level of behaviour
which would breach the appropriate standard may be tantamount to reckless disregard,
that standard nevertheless remained that of ordinary negligence taking account of all the
circumstances. The decision of the Court of Appeal in Blake v Galloway,[42] was
enunciated by Dyson L.J. in the following manner:
I would, therefore, apply the guidance given by Diplock LJ in Wooldridge,
although in a slightly expanded form, and hold that in a case such as the
present there is a breach of the duty of care owed by participant A to
participant B only where A’s conduct amounts to recklessness or a very
high degree of carelessness.
This appears to be moving further than the Court in Caldwell was prepared to go. There
is no supplemental guidance that the standard should remain that of ordinary negligence
and that the behaviour addressed merely relating to the evidential burden. It may well be
the case that the statement made has been left deliberately open to necessitate
clarification by another Court. Alternatively, it may also be seen as an acceptance by the
Court of Appeal that in the light of the unique nature of such horseplay and in particular
of sport and recreational activities, (which was discussed earlier in the judgment), the
standard should indeed be modified in this manner to take better account of this unique
nature. It is submitted that this approach is preferable to the ambiguous and confusing
approach advocated by the Court of Appeal in Caldwell. The clear application of a
standard of reckless disregard creates certainty and brings the application of legal
principle into harmony with the realities of the nature of the activity.
This is an issue that is currently being debated in standing committee in the House of
Commons with the discussion on the Promotion of Volunteering Bill. The aim of this
Private Members Bill is to provide limited legal protection for those that volunteer to
provide sports and recreational facilities. One way of doing this proposed in the Bill is to
limit negligence liability to where a Court will[43]:
Only uphold any claim for negligence or breach of statutory duty where the
volunteer has shown a reckless disregard for safety (Emphasis added)
Looked at in the light of the decision in Blake v Galloway,[44] this proposed legislation
takes on greater significance. There is the clear desire to provide limited protection for
those involved in “volunteering”. This protection has its legal basis in the decision in
Wooldridge v Sumner,[45] a decision which appeared to have fallen from favour but
which over recent years could be seen to be regaining a foothold in the debate
concerning the appropriate standard of care in sports and recreation settings. The
decision in the case in hand, coupled with the proposals contained in the Promotion of
Volunteering Bill have moved the rationale behind Wooldridge full square back onto the
centre stage of the debate between reckless disregard and ordinary negligence. It is
submitted that this is where it should now remain.
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